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Ever since the the early 1980’s, it has been a corner-stone of work in
natural-language semantics and pragmatics that any model of interpreta-
tion of natural-language has to reflect the way in which understanding of
words systematically depends on aspects of the context in which they are
produced.1 Throughout this period, however, syntacticians, semanticists
and pragmatists alike have sought to retain a clear competence-performance
distinction in which a grammar formalism is seen as a pairing of wellformed
strings of the language with interpretation to be defined in some sense inde-
pendent of considerations of use; and pragmatic theories and performance
theories of parsing or production have had to be presumed to take some core
formalism as the point of departure for their own explanations of aspects
of language use. Even those individuals who have played a central role in
promoting the importance of articulating concepts of underspecification in
understanding the relation between natural language expressions and their
interpretation in context have in general remained committed to the view
that the grammar formalism articulates some pairing of syntactic structure
for a sentential string and some representation of content for that string,
in some sense sui generis. Amongst these are relevance theorists, and they
have consistently advocated that the grammar articulates a pairing of sen-
tences with logical forms as output, these being incomplete representations
1This general stance emerged, in part, from study of the semantics of negation and
the stance that the semantics of negation systematically underspecified its mode of in-
terpretation in context: Wilson 1975, Kempson 1975, Atlas 1977, and others. But the
development of the importance of developing general accounts of how interpretation of
natural language expressions systematically required some function both of the intrinsic
content of the expression and aspects of context took off in the early 80’s and subsequently
through the work of Kamp 1981, Sperber and Wilson 1982, 1986/1995, Kamp and Reyle
1993, and many others.
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of content that constitute the input to the process of utterance interpreta-
tion, providing the evidence on the basis of which the hearer constructs an
assumption of the proposition intended to be expressed (Sperber and Wil-
son 1995, Origgi and Sperber 2002, Carston 2002). In attacking all those
they deem to be contextualists, Cappelen and Lepore (2005) have sought
nevertheless to buttress this familiar dichotomy, and the distinctiveness be-
tween semantics and pragmatics as a reflection of it, by arguing that the
extent of the context-dependence of natural language is much less than oth-
ers have argued for, there being some minimal proposition that constitutes
its interpretation that is independent of many aspects of use.
There has however been evidence accumulating in syntax and in se-
mantics quite independently of the Cappelen and Lepore vs contextualists
debate which demonstrates that the clean division of labour which Cap-
pelen and Lehore promote between what the grammar formalism provides
and what constitute pragmatic processes of interpretation in context is not
sustainable. On the one hand, internal syntactic constraints and processes
have been argued to reflect processes of parsing/production ( Hawkins 1994,
2004, Phillips 1996, Kempson et al 2001, Cann et al 2005). On the other
hand, semantic explanations have been argued to require some reflection of
pragmatic processes while nevertheless themselves constituting a subpart of
the grammar (Chierchia 2004, Ginzburg and Cooper 2004). Any of these
modifications to the otherwise universally adopted dichotomy between com-
petence models and performance models might be countered by arguing that
its proponents have slipped into the trap of providing a code model of ut-
terance interpretation (see Orrigi and Sperber 2002); but what is clear from
these several debates is that detailed articulation of the interface between
syntax, semantics and pragmatics is urgently needed.
An apparently unrelated challenge has been presented in psycholinguis-
tics (Pickering and Garrod 2004) that formal models of language and lan-
guage processing should be evaluated by how good an explanation they
provide of conversational dialogue, this being the central use of language.
This might seem of little concern to debates within pragmatics and philoso-
phy of language; but in this paper we argue to the contrary that responding
to this Pickering and Garrod challenge opens up a new perspective on these
ongoing debates. We shall argue for a grammar formalism that reflects the
incremental way in which context-dependent interpretation can be built up
online, presenting as evidence the unitary explanation of ellipsis it provides,
otherwise analysable only as a heterogeneous bunch of un-related processes.
We shall then see that this framework provides a basis for a formal account
of dialogue that provides a direct reflection of the range of data characteristic
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of conversational dialogue, while nevertheless retaining a relatively conserva-
tive assumption about the relation between grammar formalism and model
of dialogue, that a natural-language grammar does not itself constitute a
grammar of dialogue. But the consequence of adopting such a framework
will be that concepts of sentence-meaning and logical form for a sentence
sui generis have to be abandoned. So the construct on which the Cappelen
and Lepore analysis rests will turn out to be a chimera.
1 The Dialogue Challenge
Arguably the most striking property of everyday dialogue is how easily we
shift between the roles of producer and parser. We ask and answer questions
in rapid succession:
(1) A: Who did you see?
B: I saw Mary.
A: Mary?
B: Yes, with Eliot.
We extend what the other person has said, presuming interlocutors can
reconstruct the overall content whether as speaker or as hearer:
(2) A and B talking to C:
A We are going to London.
B. Tomorrow. Because Mary wants to.
We may even interrupt, and finish each other’s utterances:2
(3) A: What shall I give...
B: Eliot? A toy.
(4) Daniel: Why don’t you stop mumbling and
Marc: Speak proper like?
Daniel: speak proper?
(5) A: That tree has, uh, uh, ?
B: Tentworms.
A: Yeah.
Such shifts between speaker and hearer can take place at any point, not
necessarily at constituent breaks, and all forms of dependency may be dis-
tributed across the role-shift:
24 from the BNC, file KNY (sentences 315–317).
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(6) Ruth: What did Alex . . .
Hugh: Design for herself? A kaleidoscope.
(7) Ruth: Have you contacted
Hugh: any doctors yet? No, not yet.
And, far from being an esoteric and peripheral phenomenon, switch between
speaker and hearer roles is something which even children with newly emer-
gent language skills do with ease, as their invariant pleasure in the Old
Macdonald game clearly demonstrates:
(8) Ruth: Old MacDonald had a farm. Ee-ai-ee-ai-oh. And on that farm
he had a
Eliot: pig.
But this is by no means all. In addition, there is extensive cross speaker-
hearer parallelism in dialogue. Speakers and hearers prefer to retain parallel
strategies in shifting from the one application to the other, despite all the
prescriptivism discouraging repetition in writing. So words are repeated, the
particular interpretation ascribed to them, and the structural environment
in which that word is used (Pickering and Branigan 2001, Pickering and
Garrod 2004):
(9) Mary: What did you give the children?
Ruth: We gave Eliot a teddy-bear.
Hugh: I gave him a music-box.
Ruth: And we gave Susie a kaleidoscope.
Indeed, such patterns are not restricted to lexical subcategorisation frames
associated with particular lexical items. Over the last thirty years of lin-
guistic pedagogy, working syntacticians have been familiar with the problem
that to get robust judgements of wellformedness of long-distance dependency
effects, contexts need to be set up to induce the parallelism effects that make
such sequences natural:
(10) Bill, I think Sue is proposing as President. Tom, I am certain she is
proposing as Treasurer.
Such parallelism is striking too in language acquisition, where it is more
familiarly known as mimicking (Tomasello 2003).
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1.1 The Split Utterance Challenge
These data pose a challenge for linguists and psycholinguists alike. Conven-
tional grammar formalisms provide no basis for modelling parallelism effects,
and no means of getting a principled handle on split utterances. Question-
answer pairs are almost invariably assigned, by syntacticians at least, a foot-
note indicating that such sequences are to be treated as a single sentence;3
and split utterances aren’t treated at all. Parallelism effects might arguably
be dismissed as performance phenomena, a rhetorical preference which is
no more than a discourse constraint (see Kehler 2003, Asher and Lascarides
2004); but no such easy dismissal of the split utterance phenomenon is justi-
fiable. That such data have been largely set aside is perhaps not surprising,
since they are problematic for all theoretical or computational approaches
in which parsing and generation are seen as separate disconnected processes,
even more so when modelled as applications of a grammar formalism whose
output is the set of wellformed sentences. Both the interrupted utterance
and its follow-on completion may fail to be well-formed on their own, and so
not apparently characterisable by the grammar formalism; yet the parsing
and production mechanisms must be able to license their use. In seman-
tics, question-answer pairs have not received such short shrift: fragments in
question-answer pairs have in particular been analysed by Ginzburg and col-
leagues (Ginzburg and Sag 2000, Ginzburg et al 2001, Ginzburg and Cooper
2004, Purver 2004).4 Yet even in these analyses, the fragments are analysed
as having complete syntactic and semantic constituents which must corre-
spond in type to some abstracted/abstractable element in a contextually
given (or inferrable) question/proposition, but this leaves no room open for
extension to an account of split utterances; and furthermore it isn’t clear
how the first part of such utterances, being incomplete, can allow a parser
to infer the required contextual question.
As a first preliminary in addressing such mixed-speaker utterances, no-
tice that a simple denial that either party’s contribution to such utterances
should be characterised by mechanisms of the grammar formalism is not an
acceptable move. Consider the case of (6) with the need to establish both
wh-gap and anaphor-antecedent relations across interlocutors:
3One exception is Schlenker 2003, who analyses question-answer pairs as full paired
sentences with PF deletion, committing himself also to a correlative bi-clausal account of
pseudo-cleft structures.
4Sclangen 2003 has a similar style of analysis within SDRT. Schlangen assumes that
fragments are complete constitutents associated with complete sentential contents that
are underspecified and reconstructed from context, though for him such reconstruction is
via rhetorical relations.
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(6) Ruth: What did Alex . . .
Hugh: Design for herself? A kaleidoscope.
Presuming on some performance mechanism unrelated to grammar-internal
principles would mean that in order to explain how they could be parsed or
produced, the production or parsing device would have to involve a system
that was able to bypass the grammar formalism altogether, in such cases
relying on some grammar-external reasoning device. But this would mean
that some yet-to-be-formulated performance model would have to presume
that there are two underlying language-processing devices, one which as the
competence model is well understood but which doesn’t correspond to the
facts of dialogue performance, and the other which by assertion does match
such elliptical forms of utterance but which remains a total mystery.
With this alternative set aside, as long as what is assumed is that the
remit of the grammar formalism is to characterise all and only the wellformed
sentences of the language, the only alternative seems to be to assume that
all such fragments are treated by both the parsing and production devices as
in some sense syntactically complete, with empty categories postulated that,
for the parser, get filled in by the context, and for the producer, do not need
to be uttered aloud (following Schlenker 2003). The initial hearer of (6),
parsing What did Alex, would, on this view, have to parse an input which
is not a standard constituent, indeed may not be licensed as a wellformed
string at all, so he would have to assign the string he hears a (partial)
interpretation, presuming on some completion of the string despite lack of
appropriate input. In shifting into a speaker role, he would then have to be
seen as going on to generate an output, design for herself? from which some
previous words and their syntactic form are taken into account but are not
produced. The initial speaker, must also be able to integrate these two
fragments, but in this case she is switching from some generation module,
which maps (representations of) content onto strings, over to some parsing
module, which treats her own output as in some way parsed even though,
up to this juncture, it has been characterised by the production module
only. Such invocation of the necessary empty-category devices, whether in
the completion of incomplete fragments by the parser, or as not needing to
be said by the producer, is a standard enough manoeuvre in accounts of
ellipsis; yet it is highly problematic, not least because it involves positing
empty categories which which not only are not independently required in
the grammar formalism, but indeed must not be freely available.5
5See Stainton forthcoming for the same criticism of Stanley 2000 and Ludlow forthcom-
ing, though Stainton only takes his arguments to apply to a restricted set of fragments.
6
Things are not much better for constraint-based systems which impose
a weaker criterion of success on their grammar formalism of merely artic-
ulating a set of constraints to be met by strings of the language, allowing
sub-sentential strings to be characterised as wellformed within some larger
structure that is not (see Pullum and Scholz 2001). But with participant
switch being able to take place constituent-internally, the advantage is not
so very great. It is in such systems that correlated parsing and generation
systems have been defined (see eg Neumann 1994). Yet even though parsing
and production devices might be treated as related applications of the same
neutrally- defined system of constraints, they must nevertheless be indepen-
dently defined, with each having to be closed off before the other is invoked,
each then having to treat the output of the other as in some sense parsed (or
conversely produced), even though it is the other mechanism that has just
been being activated. And, though many (non-minimalist) parsing systems
are strictly incremental (Pritchard 1996, Sturt and Crocker 1996), gener-
ation systems are invariably head-driven (Stone et al 2003), making the
generation of utterances such as the first in (6) especially problematic. Fur-
thermore, in neither case is there reason to expect parallelism effects across
such inverse applications of the use-neutral grammar device.
The alternative might be to handle split utterances by some pragmatic
mechanism following the analysis of Stainton 2004 for data such as (11), for
which he argues no syntactic account is possible:
(11) A (stepping out of lift) Mr McWhirter’s?
B Not that way. Over there.
But any such move would raise more questions than it answers, at least if
the grammar-pragmatics feeding relation is preserved unaltered. First, there
is the question as to the nature of the input to an enrichment device (eg
one constrained by relevance) if what is provided by a string is incomplete,
as in the utterance of “What did Alex ..” in (6)? If in order to be able
to assign the string a propositional structure equivalent to that provided by
the encoding mechanism associated with the grammar, there has to be some
device which freely provides structure from null phonological input wherever
not to do so would constitute a failure of the parsing system. But this is the
problem already facing the syntactic approach to ellipsis, now re-analysed
as a much less constrained pragmatic enrichment device. Viewed within the
remit of pragmatics, the problem is that nothing that pragmatic theories
provide give us sufficient structural detail to characterise the process with
the particular limitations on it that are required. What is required is neither
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an ad-hoc concept construction process nor free enrichment, as there is no
incomplete lexical schema presented by null morphological input.6
There is then the problem of how in the shift from hearer to speaker,
the new speaker can take some representation of propositional content con-
structed as a result of some partial parsing task, and extend it in the attempt
to establish whether that expressed content constitutes what his interlocu-
tor intended to convey. In (6) again, repeated here, this would involve the
respondent, Hugh, leaping by hypothesis given the context onto some repre-
sentation of content, say ‘Alex design WH for Alex’ and trying to establish
whether what he has said is what the speaker had intended him to recover:
(6) Ruth: What did Alex . . .
Hugh: Design for herself? A kaleidoscope.
He does this by uttering the words design for herself presuming, one might
suggest, that the remainder of the expressed content does not need to be ut-
tered on the grounds that his audience, by herself having already produced
a string from which he could construct a representation at least overlap-
ping in structure with what he himself is now presenting, will, now, in her
shift into a parsing role, have both a context and a structure over which she
can define locality constraints associated with the anaphor to determine the
content of the proposition expressed. But an additional problem emerges
for this putative pragmatic account of split utterances, for the account of
(6) requires reconstruction of both wh-gap binding and establishing an an-
tecedent for the anaphor herself. By assumption, the binding principles
which determine these correlations are defined at the level of logical form,
as articulated within the grammar formalism, and this, by assumption, con-
stitutes the interface of the grammar-formalism and the application of prag-
matic enrichment processes. Yet the structure which has to be checked for
such constraint satisfaction by either party is not recoverable just from the
string which they have severally parsed or produced: it is a composite struc-
ture recovered in part from what each one has contributed and in part from
what the other has contributed. But how is this possible, given that the
constraints on interpretation which make the relevant interpretation pos-
sible are provided by some interface level that is defined as holding at a
6We note the suggestion made by Carston in passing and attributed to Breheny, that
free enrichment processes are in principle reducible to ad-hoc concept construction(Carston
2002, chapter 2, footnote 54). See Marten 2002 for a Dynamic Syntax account of all verbs
as underspecified with respect to their adicity, an analysis which would provide a formal
basis for fleshing out this proposed unification of ree enrichment and ad-hoc predicate
construction processes.
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level prior to any such pragmatic processing? One possible way out might
be to argue that the level of logical form is merely an interface which con-
stitutes some concept of sentence-meaning as articulated by the grammar,
with implementations of that grammar formalism able to side-step such a
level in realising what in performance is incremental word by word update
of interpretation (Carston 2002). But this merely serves to suggest that any
explanatory account of utterance-interpretation does not involve any such
level.
The problems for pragmatists continue with the construal of the fragment
answer in (6) that follows up the apparently collaboratively constructed
question, but with an extra difficulty. This second answer to the question
also needs to be assumed to be associated with a complete syntactic struc-
ture: this at least is an uncontentious move, in so far as such fragment
construal is standardly analysed as a syntactic form of ellipsis. But if so,
then the utterance of a kaleidoscope will have to be taken to constitute an
utterance of the sentence Alex designed a kaleidoscope for herself, without
any context-dependent form of construal specific to the ellipsis itself, because
the so-called PF deletion which underpins syntactic accounts of ellipsis re-
quires such constructs as input). Most of this has to be re-calculated by
the speaker, Hugh, as not needing to be said on the basis that his hearer
Ruth, by assumption, has a logical-form tree constructed over which the
binding principles are again defined as licensed – again, not that provided
by the proposition which their split utterance might actually be taken to be
expressing, for this is external to the grammar formalism. The specific prob-
lem here is the relation of the fragment a kaleidoscope to the wh-question to
which it provides an answer. Carston, in passing, suggests that answers to
questions may involve direct use of some propositional form recovered from
the question, with the fragment replacing the wh term in argument position
(Carston 2002: 174). Maybe, but such a process would have to be seen as
quite independent of the otherwise adopted grammar formalism, since such
an account is not matched by either movement or constraint-based accounts
of wh expressions, for these invariably analyse the wh expression as a propo-
sitional variable-binding operator.7 So this move appears to be heading into
7There are several extant analyses of wh expressions, in some semantic accounts as an
abstraction operator hence of predicate type (See Dayal 1996, Groenendijk and Stokhof
1991) but in all syntactic approaches (Minimalism, LFG, HPSG), the wh-expression is a
variable-binding operator for which a truth-theoretic characterisation constitutes the set
of possible answers, each of these being a full truth-value-denoting proposition (Schlenker
2003). See Kempson et al 2001 for an alternative view in which wh expressions project
specialised place-holders, to be replaced by substitution of a term provided by the answer,
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uncharted territory in which pragmatic assumptions need to invoke types of
structure for which orthodox grammar formalisms provide no basis.
In the face of these problems, a wise pragmatist might seek to leave the
challenge of explaining ellipsis data to syntacticians wherever arguments
have been provided for its syntactic basis, as indeed Carston does. But
this isn’t a legitimate move, even setting aside such data as (11), since
ellipsis construal isn’t blindly syntactic. In particular it isn’t analysable at
a level of logical form associated with the words in the string, neither in the
completion of some interrupted string, nor in its fragment continuation, as
the indexicals in (12) show:
(12) A: Where have you got to with..
B: your book? Up to Chapter 4.
In (12), no level of logical form independent of the fixing of interpretation of
pronouns is appropriate, for the role of hearer essential to appropriate fixing
of the pronoun, has altered in the middle of the exchange. The form of the
pronoun indeed remains the same, as though appropriately completing the
string of words initiated by the first speaker, but such a completion would
not correspond to the interpretation intended, or successfully recovered.
Of course, without either pragmatists or syntacticians having addressed
split utterance phenomena directly, these attempts at constructing either
type of account are nothing more than hypothetical straws. Semantic ac-
counts of ellipsis manipulating higher-order abstraction might seem to offer
more hope, but since any form of syntactic dependency can be split across
interlocutors, any such account faces the implausible commitment to the
view that all structural dependencies can be re-analysed in exclusively se-
mantic terms, all syntactic dependencies being able to be realised across the
speaker-role switch, a stance which is implicitly denied by all frameworks
with independent syntactic and semantic specifications (see Partee (ed.)
1976).8 At the very least, the feeding relations between grammar-internal
and pragmatic processes of reconstruction which these fragments demand
remain an open problem.
In the rest of the paper, we take up this challenge and show how the use
of ellipsis in dialogue, the split-utterance, and other dialogue phenomena set
out by Pickering and Garrod can all be naturally explained by adopting the
Dynamic Syntax (DS) framework in which words in a string are mapped
an analysis much more commensurable with the Carston suggestion - see section 3.1.
8See Dalrymple et al 1991 for the observation that higher-order unification accounts
are over-liberal in not being able to exclude variable-binding abstractions across structural
configurations which syntactic restrictions are defined to debar.
10
incrementally onto representations of context-relative content; and, as part
of this, we offer a structured concept of context from which a unitary ac-
count of ellipsis becomes available. What we shall show is that progressive
word-by-word construction of propositional form provides exactly what we
need to reflect the dynamics displayed in dialogue both from a parsing and
a production perspective. The result in all cases matches representational-
ist assumptions, but with a twist: the Dynamic Syntax accounts of ellipsis
and dialogue phenomena succeed in virtue of not positing the relevance-
theoretic level of logical form, indeed not positing any semantic concept of
sentence-meaning. To the contrary, elliptical fragments may depend on con-
text directly as input to their construal, using either previously established
representations of content, or the actions used in establishing those repre-
sentations: the result of such context re-use is a new propositional formula
without any possibility of invoking an intermediate level corresponding to
some putative “linguistic content” expressed by the ellipsis site independent
of context.
2 The Dynamics of Language Parsing
Dynamic Syntax is radical in being a grammar formalism which models
the stepwise way in which interpretation is built up in context during a
parse as progressive construction of a tree-structure represent of content,
and in positing that as the sole basis for syntactic explanation (Kempson
et al 2001, Cann et al 2005). The point of departure for the Dynamic Syn-
tax program was the goal of defining a formal architecture under-pinning
language processing in context, as a means of enabling formal study of con-
straints imposed by relevance-theoretic assumptions: the general methodol-
ogy is to adopt a representationalist stance vis a vis content (Fodor 1983)
but, further, to argue that concepts of underspecification and update should
be extended from semantics/pragmatics into syntax, where the concept of
progressive update of partial trees totally replaces the semantically blind
syntactic specifications characteristic of such formalisms as Minimalism and
HPSG. Phrase structure rules, lexical specifications, and all concepts of
movement or analogous feature passing devices are replaced by procedures
for updating partial representations of content (see Kempson et al 2001,
Cann et al 2005, Purver et al 2007 for formal details).
The general process of parsing can be seen as successive processes of
update from an initial one-node tree simply stating the goal of the interpre-
tation process (the first tree in figure 1), to an output, the second tree in
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figure 1, which is a fully decorated tree whose topnode is a representation of
some proposition expressed, and whose individual nodes are decorated with
subterms of that formula. Each node in the tree has a concept formula, e.g.
Fo(John′) representing some individual John, and an indication of what
semantic type that concept is (Fo for Formula). The primitive types are
types e and t. Type e is for expressions that denote individuals (e for “en-
tity”, Ty for Type); type t is for propositional formulae, that denote truth
values (t for “truth-value”). All other types are functions defined on these.9
The tree reflects solely predicate-argument structure, with no order of words
reflected in the tree: by convention functor terms decorate a node on a right
branch, argument terms a left branch node. There is invariably one node
under development in any partial tree, as indicated by the pointer ♦:10
(13) John upset Mary.
?Ty(t),♦ 7→ Ty(t), Fo(Upset′(Mary′)(John′)),♦
Fo(John′)
Ty(e)
Fo(Upset′(Mary′))
Ty(e→ t)
Fo(Mary′)
Ty(e)
Fo(Upset′)
Ty(e→ (e→ t))
Figure 1: Parsing John upset Mary
The concept of requirement ?X for any decoration X is central. Decorations
on nodes such as ?Ty(t), ?Ty(e), ?Ty(e → t) etc. express requirements
to construct formulae of the appropriate type on the nodes so decorated
(propositions, terms and predicates respectively), and these drive the sub-
sequent tree-construction process. The general dynamics is to unfold a tree
structure imposing such requirements by a combination of general rules for
tree growth and lexical actions contributing concepts and other aspects of
structure, and then compositionally to determine the combination of those
concepts in a strictly bottom-up fashion to yield the overall interpretation,
leaving no requirements outstanding. In this case, a combination of general
9The list of types is highly restricted: unlike categorial grammar formalisms (see eg
Morrill 1994), there is no recursive definition of types, no type-lifting or composition of
functions.
10Throughout this paper, and indeed elsewhere in the development of DS to date, a
highly simplified account of proper names is assumed, with no attempt to address the
substantial issues in addressing the context-sensitivity specific to linguistic names.
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tree growth principles and more specific tree update actions provided by the
words John, upset and Mary together dictate the successful outcome.
Just as the concept of tree growth is central, so too is the concept of pro-
cedure for mapping one partial tree to another, with its associated concept
of underspecification, essential to reflecting the input to such procedures.
Individual transitions from partial tree to partial tree are all defined as pro-
cedures for tree growth, whether these are generally articulated constraints
or specific tree update actions constituting the lexical content of words.
Syntactic and lexical specifications are very tightly coordinated, differing
primarily in that the former are optional constraints on tree development,
the latter obligatory macros of tree-growth given the presence in the string
of that word. For example, the word upset induces a sequence of actions that
updates a predicate-requiring node, adding to this node two further nodes
and the two-place relation Upset′, leaving the pointer at the constructed
object-requiring node awaiting further development:11
upset
IF {?Ty(e→ t)}
THEN make(〈↓1〉); go(〈↓1〉);
put(Fo(λxλy.Upset′(x)(y)), T y(e→ (e→ t)), [↓]⊥);
go(〈↑1〉); make(〈↓0〉)
go(〈↓0〉); put(?Ty(e))
ELSE ABORT
The intrinsic contribution which a word makes to utterance interpretation
is thus invariably more than just a specification of some concept.
Of the various attendant concepts of underspecification, two are of par-
ticular importance, that associated with anaphoric expressions and that
associated with left-peripheral expressions, in other frameworks “extracted”
from some clause-internal position. Anaphoric expressions are defined as
adding to a node in a tree a place-holding metavariable of a given type.
The value of such a metavariable is driven by the associated requirement
?∃xFo(x) which has to be satisfied either by selection of a value from con-
11The action predicates are transparently tree-building predicates. The formal system
underpinning the partial trees that are constructed is a logic of finite trees (LOFT: Black-
burn and Meyer-Viol 1994). There are two basic modalities, 〈↓〉 and 〈↑〉, such that 〈↓〉α
holds at a node if α holds at its daughter, and the inverse, 〈↑〉α, holds at a node if α holds
at its mother. Function and argument relations are distinguished by defining two types
of daughter relation, 〈↓0〉 for argument daughters, 〈↓1〉 for functor daughters ( with their
inverses 〈↑0〉, 〈↑1〉). So the instruction (make(〈↓0〉) is an instruction to build an argument
daughter node, and so on. Kleene * operators are also defined over these relations, so that
〈↑∗〉Tn(a) is a decoration on a node, indicating that somewhere dominating it is the node
Tn(a).
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text or from the construction process (all aspects of underspecification are
associated with a requirement for their update). In consequence, though
pronouns contribute to the monotonic tree growth process like all other
words, they do not introduce a fully specified concept.
he
IF ?Ty(e)
THEN put(Ty(e)); Type statement
put(Fo(UMale′)); Metavariable and Presupposition
put(?∃x.Fo(x)); Formula Requirement
↓ [⊥]) Bottom Restriction
put(?〈↑0〉Ty(t)) Case Condition
ELSE ABORT
Of the decorations provided by the pronoun, UMale′ is the metavariable,
↓ [⊥] is the restriction that the node it decorates must be a terminal node
in the tree in all developments.12
In similar style but pertaining to structure, long-distance dependency
effects are by definition associated with a introduction of an underspeci-
fied structural relation whose value, equally, must be provided either from
context or the construction process.13
(14) Mary, John upset.
So in (14), for example, the word Mary is construed as providing a term
to be used in deriving the resulting logical form, but the node which it
decorates does not have its relation within the overall structure yet fixed
(Fig.2) - formally the construction of a new node within in a partial tree
is licensed from some node requiring a propositional type (annotated as
?Ty(t)), with that relation being characterised only as that of domination
(weakly specified tree relations are indicated by a dashed line).
〈↑∗〉Tn(0) is the characterisation that the constructed node is dominated by
the rootnode along a succession of mother relations, allowing an arbitrary
12This restriction is lost by expletive pronouns, whose interpretation can be provided
by subsequent composite structure built up during the interpretation process, a property
also shared with triggers for ellipsis, as we shall see. The characterisation ?〈↑0〉Ty(t) is
the nominative specification.
13See 3.1 for an argument that the type of fragment ellipsis argued by Stainton forthcom-
ing to be intransigent for syntactic explanations of ellipsis, constitutes a context-provided
enrichment of such a relation.
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?Ty(t), Tn(0)
Fo(Mary′),♦
?∃xTn(x)
〈↑∗〉Tn(0)
Figure 2: step (i) in parsing (14)
number of such relations between the node so introduced and the root.14
Like all forms of underspecification, such underspecified nodes are always
associated with a requirement for update.15 The position of this unfixed
node is subsequently determined, following an arbitrary number of interme-
diate steps in the interpretation process. In the parsing of (14), this point
comes after processing the word upset, when the opportunity to update a re-
quirement for an internal argument provided by the parse of the word upset
will arise. At that juncture, there will not only be the unfixed node, but also
a structure with the concept Fo(Upset′) labelling a functor node, and a node
introduced to provide its internal argument, this needing to be completed:
so there will be two terminal nodes of the tree both with requirements in
need of resolution (Fig.3). Both these requirements can be resolved at once
?Ty(t)
Fo(Mary’)
?∃xTn(x)
Fo(John’) ?Ty(e→ t)
?Ty(e),♦ Fo( Upset’)
Figure 3: After processing upset’ in (14)
if the relation between the node which the formula Mary′ decorates and
the topnode is taken to be that of “grand-daughter”. Hence the unification
of the node decorated by Fo(Mary) and the ?Ty(e)-decorated node where
the pointer is. From then on, the process is one of combining the concepts
Fo(Upset′) and Fo(Mary′), and then the predicate Fo(Upset′(Mary′)) and
14This is a standard tree-theoretic characterisation and is formally identical to that of
functional uncertainty of LFG, differing from it only in the concept of update that maps
it into a richer structure of the same type (see Kaplan and Zaenen 1988).
15This takes the form of a decoration ?∃xTn(x): Tn is a predicate of the description
language, whose arguments range over tree nodes).
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Fo(John′) to yield the logical form Fo(Upset′(Mary′)(John′)), the very
same tree as expressed by John upset Mary.
What this simple example illustrates is that strings with the same inter-
pretation may be assigned the same tree representation as output content, in
which case any syntactic differences between two such strings will have to be
reflected solely in the sequence of actions that lead to that output.16 Hence
the claim that syntactic properties of natural language are to be explained in
terms of the propositional structure corresponding to interpretation as built
up relative to context plus the process of establishing that interpretation.17
It might seem that all such talk of trees as representations of content
could not in principle simultaneously serve as both a syntactic explanation
and a basis for semantic interpretation, because of the problems posed by
quantification, universally assumed to necessitate a globally defined process
expressing scope dependencies between quantifying expressions. But such
scepticism isn’t warranted. In adopting a representationalist and syntactic
perspective on inference, this framework presumes a proof-theoretic charac-
terisation of inference and so casts all NPs as projecting type e expressions.
Quantified expressions are taken to map onto arbitrary names of type e
following the natural-deduction proof-procedure for predicate-logic as for-
mulated in the epsilon calculus,18 with quantifying determiners analysed
as a procedure for constructing such terms. The mechanism for projecting
these terms involves the incremental accumulation of constraints on scope
dependency as variously derivable from linear order effects and idiosyncratic
lexical specifications: these scope statements are collected at the local type-
16Here we have only introduced strategies for developing individual trees. However in
DS, linked trees can be constructed, induced by an adjunction process which though a
freely available transition in itself imposes a requirement for a token-identical copy of the
formula decorating the head from which the transition is defined. This device is pre-
sumed to underpin relative clause construal, clausal adjuncts, enabling a characterisation
of strong island constraints in terms of required resolution of structural underspecification
associated with unfixed node relations within an individual tree.
17This style of analysis, with long-distance dependency effects and anaphora resolu-
tion expressed in the same terms of tree growth, can be applied to a broad range of
syntactic puzzles facing conventional grammar formalisms, in particular to the range of
interactions between anaphoric and structural processes, which can be expressed while pre-
serving the unitary nature of any individual anaphoric expression in a way that escapes
other formalisms: expletives, resumptive pronouns, restrictive vs nonrestrictive relatives,
scrambling,and the E-type effects associated with head-internal relatives, (mismatching)
agreement phenomena (Kempson et al 2001, Cann et al 2005).
18The epsilon calculus constitutes the formal study of arbitrary names (Hilbert and
Bernays 1939). The details of this account of quantification will play no role in the
arguments in this paper. See Kempson et al 2001 for a formal specification, and Purver
et al 2007 for discussion of scope effects in ellipsis.
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t-requiring node, and an algorithm then applies to the resulting predicate-
argument structure spelling out how these statements determine the partic-
ular interpretation in question. So though final evaluation of dependencies
between quantifying terms is defined for predicate-argument structure as a
whole, hence in this sense globally, the method of collecting the necessary
statements on which the articulation of such scope dependencies will de-
pend is strictly incremental. The overall process is thus growth of a single
level of (semantic) structure from phonological input. It isn’t strings that
have structure, but only the progressively accumulating interpretation that
is built up from them. The syntax is the process by which such structures
are built and this provcess is given by the set of actions induced by parsing
the words of an utterance in strict linear order.
3 Ellipsis construal
With these tools for describing tree-growth to hand, we can now explore in
more detail the concept of context on which the account of dialogue will turn;
and this is where ellipsis comes in. Considered pretheoretically, one would
expect that ellipsis should provide a particularly good window on what con-
stitutes context, as it constitutes nothing other than re-use of what context
makes available. We shall immediately see that the DS account enables us
to characterise this phenomenon as a structure-building mechanism, hence
syntactic, while nevertheless preserving this informal intuition, and in do-
ing so providing a unitary basis for ellipsis construal despite its disparate
effects.19 As we now see, construal of ellipsis can be seen as involving re-use
of formulae, structure and actions from the (immediate) context). So prag-
matic processes too can be explained in terms of manipulating (partial) tree
structure representations of content.
19This account of ellipsis as a central instance of the context-dependence of natural
language is not matched at least by syntactic accounts of ellipsis, since the assumption
that the explanation is syntactic necessitates its analysis grammar-internally, hence not
as a context-dependent phenomenon (Fiengo and May 1994). This leads to the paradox-
ical situation in which despite convincing arguments that some fragment construal must
be seen as able to be controlled directly from the context (Stainton 2004), this account
is not extended to fragment ellipsis in general. The effect is an otherwise unmotivated
distinction between those types of ellipsis whose construal yields a structure that is char-
acterised grammar-internally and those types of ellipsis whose construal, despite being no
less internally structured, is not characterised by a grammar-internal process.
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3.1 Use of context-provided formulae
First, elliptical phenomena demonstrate the ability by language-users to pick
up on terms as made available in some context tree, re-using a predicate for-
mula just established by a simple substitution process. This is illustrated
with the anaphoric use of VP ellipsis, via the projection of a predicate
meta-variable provided by the auxiliary did, and identification of that vari-
able from formula values made available in the immediate context got from
parsing previous strings. The result is the so-called strict reading of ellipsis,
the exact analogue of pronominal construal.20
(15) Q: Who upset Mary?
Ans: John did.
Parsing John did:
Context: Tree under Construction:
Ty(t), Fo(Upset′(Mary′)(WH))
Fo(WH)
Ty(e→ t),
Fo(Upset′(Mary′))
Fo(Mary′) Fo(Upset′)
?Ty(t)
Fo(John′)
Fo(DO),
T y(e→ t)
?∃x.Fo(x),♦
⇑
Fo(Upset′(Mary′))
We assume here an account of wh expressions as providing a particularised
metavariable that acts as a place-holder for the answer (incidentally just the
structure Carston was invoking in her suggestion for wh-construal (Carston
2002: 174).21 The answer in reply then provides a value for this metavari-
able, and the VP pro-predicate is analysed as provided a value by the pred-
icate formula Fo(Upset′(Mary′)).
This account commits us to saying that indexical interpretations of VP
ellipsis are available, since metavariables by definition can be provided values
from contextually provided representations of content, and these are by no
means restricted to representations established from linguistic processing
(see Hankamer and Sag 1976 for the contrary view). Consider the case of a
20Fo(DO) is a metavariable whose substituends are restricted to denoting actions, or
more generally eventualities.
21Unlike other analyses, the DS account does not analyse the wh expression as a quan-
tifying operator binding over a propositional domain. See Kempson et al 2001 ch.5 for
detailed argumentation that wh question-words are not scope-taking expressions in the
manner of regular quantified expressions. There are various forms the very weak term
projected by a wh expression might take (see Cann et al 2005 for discussion).
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mother and teenage son standing at the shore’s edge looking at the size of the
waves, with the mother deciding how best to dissuade her son from surfing.
A mere command “Don’t go now” would surely risk the very action she is
hoping to dissuade him from. A much less confrontation-risking comment
might take the form:
(16) I wouldn’t if I were you. There are severe rip tides round here.
All that is required for the success of this utterance on this view, is that
the context for utterance interpretation can be presumed to contain repre-
sentations of content established from other forms of input than linguistic
processing.
Not all ellipsis is this simple, since not all elliptical forms involve a VP
pro-form, for example, question and fragment answers. In these, the expres-
sion which provides the answer is updating the very structure provided by
the parse of the question.
(17) Q: Who did John upset?
Ans: Himself.
In taking up these within a DS perspective, what has to be remembered is
that though all supposedly fronted expressions are analysed as projecting
an initially unfixed node, this structure is updated by the time the inter-
pretation process is complete. So the output of the parse of the question
will be a structure in which the metavariable provided by the wh expression
will be decorating an in situ object node.22 In the case to hand, the prob-
lem that presents itself is that the interpretability hence wellformedness of
the elliptical answer, himself, depends on there being available the structure
which provides the antecedent whereby the reflexive can be locally identi-
fied. This the structure set up in parsing the question itself provides, as
long as some optional final step in parsing a wh question is presumed, that
moves the pointer back to the node decorated with the metavariable. The
parse of the fragment thus takes that very structure as input and updates it
to a structure in which the object argument has a fixed value (as displayed
in (18)).
22There are consequences to this account of wh expressions as specialised variables,
rather than binding operations. Since with this metavariable as its formula, the wh ex-
pression will not be able to project an associated scope dependency, the resulting structure
cannot be evaluated as having a complete set of scope statements. Some requisite complete
set of scope statements will only be available once that underspecified term is replaced.
The need for a substituend, i.e. an answer, follows immediately.
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(18) Parsing himself:
Tree as Context: becomes Tree under Construction:
Fo(Upset′(WH)(John′))
Fo(John′) Fo(Upset′(WH))
Fo(WH)
♦
Fo(Upset′)
Fo(Upset′(WH)(John′))
Fo(John′) Fo(Upset′(WH))
Fo(WH),♦
⇑
Fo(John′)
Fo(Upset′)
This example provides our first ellipsis-related evidence that construal
does not involve building any construct corresponding to a linguistic speci-
fication of sentence-meaning. Here the fragment takes as context some open
structure with a place-holder for the formula value at the object-argument
node, but all other values are fixed. The only underspecified term in the
context is the variable projected by the actions given by the wh expression.
This the fragment itself updates with a procedure provided by the anaphor
that obligatorily identifies the object argument value with the subject argu-
ment, here provided by the context.
Confirmation that fragments provide a license to construct a proposi-
tional form directly from the fragment itself comes from the problems that
face the contrary presumption that decoding the fragment yields only some
weakly specified sentence-meaning. In principle, one might consider the
possibility of positing an account of fragments in terms of invariably intro-
ducing decorations on some unfixed node dominated by the type-t-requiring
node as a general context-independent strategy for fragment construal while
otherwise preserving DS assumptions, with the context being taken to pro-
vide an open propositional structure (on the representational analogue of
the abstraction account of Dalrymple et al 2001). This might be thought to
have the additional advantage of providing a single process of construal for
all forms of ellipsis, on the one structure/one analysis methodology familiar
in other formalisms. However, from a DS perspective, any such abstraction
process would be unattractive. It would have to be defined as a special op-
eration on contexts, since it would directly conflict with the assumption of
monotonic tree-growth processes of construal. Such a move might be war-
ranted when local inconsistency between speaker and hearer contexts sub-
sequent to some parsing process forces some revision of context, but used as
a general mechanism for ellipsis construal, there would be no such warrant
for a move so contrary to the regular process of interpretation build-up.
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There are, in any case, as Stainton (forthcoming) points out, problems
with such a process. Since the fragment, by assumption, is taken to decorate
an unfixed node, the context-abstracted predicate would have to yield a
structure with which the unfixed node would unify, exactly as though a
long-distance dependency structure. However, in (19), this is not problem-
free:
(19) A: The Pope likes bagels and what?
B: Frankfurters.
The island-effect of coordinate structures is modelled in DS as requiring the
building of paired quasi-independent structures (so-called linked structures:
Cann et al 2005): and these are said to preclude the resolution of an un-
fixed tree relation across in the second structure. This is the basis of the
ungrammaticality of
(20) *What does the Pope like bagels and?
The consequence of such an account of conjunction, however, is to preclude
the possibility of interpreting the fragment in (19) as involving the con-
struction and decoration of an unfixed node in terms of introducing an open
propositional structure with an unfixed node to be resolved is precluded.23
However on the contrary view that the actions encoded in the fragment may
directly update some fixed node in the structure indicated by the wh ex-
pression as provided by the context, is straightforward. Just as the wh-in
situ expression in the question can be taken to decorate a linked structure
and then be incorporated into the decorated tree (the procedure needed for
conjunction), so too can the reply.
3.2 Use of context-provided actions
It might be counter-argued that this account of ellipsis as involving context-
relative parsing of the fragment is unsustainable since linguistic forms can
be re-used to yield a new interpretation rather than simply matching that
provided by the context, as in all sloppy ellipsis construals, where linguistic
forms are in some sense re-used to yield a modified interpretation:
23The argument is a direct extension of Stainton’s argument against Merchant 2004 that
any analysis of ellipsis in terms of a Move-and-Delete process will yield the wrong results
(Stainton forthcoming). The characterisation of an unfixed node is in terms of a disjunc-
tion across sequences of daughter relations, 〈↑∗〉Tn(n) from some node n, precluding a
transition across from one tree to a distinct structure.
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(21) Q: Who upset his mother?
Ans: John.
In these cases, since the interpretation of the question standardly allows
binding of any pronoun in the VP, here his, by what is taken to be the wh
operator, the sloppy ellipsis construal seems again to warrant an abstraction
process, here a retraction of content from that provided by the immediate
context to establish λx[Upset′(ǫ, y,Mother′(x)(y))(x)] in order that this cre-
ated predicate can be applied to the term provided by the fragment. But, as
we have already seen, this form of analysis runs contrary to DS assumptions.
There is however a simple alternative, which has the advantage of preserv-
ing the intuition that context itself determines ellipsis construal. This is
to presume that the actions used in establishing that construal of the first
utterance are themselves available in the context, and so can be re-used just
as structure can be. The actions that have to be applied in the construal of
John in (21) as ‘John upset John’s mother’ are identical to the actions which
have just been used in the parse of the question, hence which the context
makes available. This sloppy ellipsis construal arises because amongst the
actions so reiterated from the context is the projection of a metavariable to
be identified as before from the subject argument, which in the new context
provided by the just parsed subject expression John will give rise to the
new predicate ‘upset John’s mother’.24 So here we have identity of actions,
analogous to identity of structure or formula value, an analysis which applies
to all parallelism effects in ellipsis involving rebinding. Hence this account
of sloppy construal of elliptical form retains a concept of identical re-use of
some context-provided construct, despite the non-identical resulting inter-
pretation.
A bonus of this analysis is that it strengthens the parallelism between
anaphoric expressions and ellipsis without any reshuﬄing of syntactic or
morphological features to preserve some requisite concept of linguistic iden-
tity (as argued for by Fiengo and May 1994 and adopted by many others):
(22) John has washed his socks and so has Sue.
(23) A: You’re sitting on my chair.
B: No I’m not.
24See Cann et al 2005 for extensive justification, and Purver et al 2007 for a detailed
specification of how such re-application of actions yields parallel results in the new con-
text, including the interaction of ellipsis and quantification. The particular derivation of
(21) assumes an analysis of the genitive as inducing a dependent epsilon term, with a
predicate of which one argument is a bound-variable, the other an argument filled by the
NP contained in the determiner.
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On this account of ellipsis, no such stipulation is necessary: fragments are
simply parsed using structure or actions which the context provides.25 The
re-use of actions selected from some minimal context is expected, with
variation relative to the new context in which they are re-applied. Ac-
tions from context will moreover only be available as a record of previously
parsed/produced utterances; so the report that at least some forms of el-
lipsis construal require a linguistic antecedent (Hankamer and Sag 1976) is
matched in the analysis. The account thus directly reflects the intuition
that ellipsis involves reconstruction from context in direct parallelism with
anaphora, despite its tighter association with what is traditionally thought
to be a grammar-internal process of syntax.
The effect of this account is that all ellipsis construal is now seen to follow
Stainton’s proposal for pragmatic construal of elliptical fragments of being
an intrinsic part of the process that builds up the proposition expressed,
though unlike Stainton’s account, this process is taken as the general mech-
anism, duly formalised, rather than being some mysterious add-on to an
otherwise syntactic account. This might seem to risk the down-side that
there is no basis for characterising what is distinctive about cases such as
(11) which constituted Stainton’s particular challenge for syntactic accounts
of ellipsis:
(11) A (stepping out of lift) Mr McWhirter’s?
B Not that way. Over there.
But, to the contrary, the Stainton type of case simply falls into place, to
complete the picture of parallelism between structural and anaphoric un-
derspecification. In this type of case, it does indeed seem that the only
available DS strategy is to invoke the building of an unfixed node and con-
struct some predicate with an open term-requiring node with which that
node might unify. But this is the analogue of movement, which is the very
strategy which Stainton correctly argues is not applicable to this type of
case, since it would allow, wrongly, also (20). But no such problem arises,
given a DS perspective, for nothing requires a unique sequence of actions for
a given string or type of string. The essence of a parse system is its flexibil-
ity, providing a number of ways in which interpretation can be built up. All
that is required for wellformedness of a string is that there be at least one
sequence of actions leading from the starting point via the action sequence
25Pronoun construal that involves re-use of actions provided by context is given by the
paycheck examples of Kartunnen 1968:
(i) John puts his paycheck in the bank, but Bill keeps it under his bed.
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imposed by the words in the order given. So in the one type of case, (19)
and (21), a fragment can be construed by identifying it as providing a deco-
ration to a node already provided in context by a previous parse, but in that
sequence of actions left incomplete, as wh expressions specifically allow. In
another type of case, (11), a fragment might be used to decorate an unfixed
node and this time, its structural relation be updated by constructing the
appropriate predicate not from any previous linguistic processing but from
the visual scenario, as with indexical construal of anaphoric expressions. It
is notable that this strategy of updating NP fragments from context without
any linguistic antecedent from which to construct the appropriate interpre-
tation is only available in highly routinised exchanges, such as request for
directions, ordering food, buying tickets, etc. This is not evidence of there
being a freely available abstraction device, but merely evidence that peo-
ple may store fixed open structures as input for interpretation processes to
complete them, analogous to the storing of routinised actions. Furthermore,
given the claimed formal parallelism between anaphoric underspecification
of content and structural underspecification of tree-node relations, we would
expect there to be cases where the construction of underspecified relations
can be updated from context in addition to its update from within the con-
struction process itself: indeed this analysis brings these Stainton cases into
the general form of explanation. The problems that arise for the Merchant-
style movement account do so because such an account defines ellipsis over
natural-language strings, whose properties must therefore match properties
independently observed of natural-language strings. No such problems arise
for the present analysis, where ellipsis construal, like all other construal,
is defined as the building up of conceptual structure. To the contrary, we
expect the strategy of building an unfixed node to be used as the means of
providing initial structure for the fragment in the absence of any already
provided structure or linguistic processing, as long as it could then be en-
riched indexically from representations culled from the discourse scenario
itself. And since recovering information from the entities existing in the dis-
course scenario, by assumption, may involve the construction of conceptual
representations without the use of actions, these being specific to the parse
process, we also expect that the building of partial trees may involve the
recovery of stored partial structures. Indeed, as we shall see when we turn
to dialogue, the account we propose will have the effect that information
culled from the context will be used in all language processing as long as
commensurate with the words to be processed.
This account of ellipsis has the leading edge over other accounts. This is
an area which, notoriously, has been split between proposed syntactic and
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semantic analyses, neither type providing a comprehensive explanation of
the phenomenon. By defining syntax as the progressive incremental growth
of logical structure, the DS perspective, as a first bonus, unifies the various
apparently heterogeneous “syntactic” forms of ellipsis. It gives substance
to the Stainton account of indexical construal of fragments by providing a
formal account of context; and it adds to it a detailed articulation of the pro-
cess involved in establishing context-relative interpretations. Furthermore,
what Stainton analyses as two mutually exclusive forms of ellipsis construal
become complementary parts of a larger perspective in which language in-
put is interpreted relative to context: there is simply no dichotomy between
those processes of ellipsis which are grammar-internal and those which are
not.
4 Production - The Dynamic Syntax Account
Ellipsis is a central tool in dialogue; and the account of production needed
to turn this account of ellipsis into one that that can apply in the to-and-
fro of speaker-hearer exchanges of dialogue is surprisingly straightforward
(Purver and Otsuka 2003, Otsuka and Purver 2003, Purver et al 2007).
Given that the parsing procedure constitutes, by assumption, the grammar
formalism, the first working assumption might be that the very same rules
apply in production also; and it turns out to be remarkably successful.26
The essential difference between parsing and production is that, while the
parser may not know in advance the interpretation to be constructed, the
producer in contrast must do so, at least in part.27 Reflecting these informal
statements, we assume that in generation, the very same computational
actions initiate the development of some tree, but this time, each update
step has to meet the severe restriction of not merely being an enrichment
as in parsing, but of being a precise form of enrichment – a sequence of
progressive enrichments towards yielding a particular tree – the selected so-
called goal tree representing the interpretation to be conveyed (formally a
subsumption relation being required to hold between the parse tree and the
goal tree). So in (24) for example, the production task is taken to start with
a zero string, the input to the parse process, and a regular tree representation
of content (figure 4)):
(24) John snores
26Thanks to Matthew Stone, who suggested this.
27In principle the so-called goal tree which corresponds to the representation of intended
content may be only partial, but we do not develop this here.
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String
ε
Parse Tree
?Ty(t),♦
Goal Tree
Fo(John),
T y(e)
Fo(Snore),
T y(e→ t)
!
!
!
!
H
H
H
H
Fo(Snore(John)), T y(t)
Figure 4: The input to producing John snores
From this, parse sequences lead to the progressive unfolding of a tree exactly
as before except that at each point, including steps of lexicon-search, the
only successful update candidates are those which are commensurate with
the provided goal tree. With this sketch, we have the beginnings of a basis
of an incremental account of production
Lexical search There is however a considerable problem to confront in
proposing an incremental account of production.28 Search in the lexicon on
this account in principle involves incremental item by item search, a task
which, given the size of the lexicon, threatens to be intractable. It is a task
made worse by the fact that the goal tree relative to which the update check
is made and the words to be selected are members of discrete systems, the
items on the tree being items in a conceptual system, the items in the string
being natural-language words. So the search is for an appropriate pairing of
terms in two discrete systems.
4.1 The context-sensitivity of production
However, keeping psycholinguistic considerations uppermost, we propose
that production, like every other cognitive activity, is context-dependent,
much of the time not involving search of the lexicon, but merely, as does
parsing, the context. This immediately reduces the size of the problem which
incremental full lexicon search poses. Consider the production of He upset
her in the context of having uttered John ignored Mary :
(25) John ignored Mary. He upset her
In producing the sentence He upset her in the context of either of the par-
ticipants having said John ignored Mary, the speaker will, just as in pars-
28This involves the so-called Logical Form Equivalence Problem that there is no deter-
ministic route from semantic representation onto string. The threatening intransigence of
this problem was brought to light by Shieber 1993, and it remains a recognised puzzle con-
fronting putative models of generation, despite the increasing and uncontested evidence
that generation is just as incremental as parsing (Ferreira 1996 and others following).
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ing, have as the immediate context the tree with topnode decorated with
Fo(Ignore′(Mary′)(John′)). The production of He upset her then allows
choice of the word he on the basis that in the immediate context is an appro-
priate occurrence of Fo(John′) a copy of which, substituting the metavari-
able lexically associated with the actions of the pronoun, will indeed meet
the subsumption requirement with the goal tree. So, still just as in parsing,
producing a pronoun depends on there being a suitable Formula value in
context: the only difference between parsing and production is that there is
in production, the subsumption requirement.29
The advantage of pronouns in language for the production task is imme-
diate. As long as pronouns are presumed themselves to be easily available
as a lexical expression, their selection bypasses the general lexicon search,
replacing it with search in the immediate context. Thus in saying he upset
her in an utterance of (25), the only word for which the general lexicon has
to be scanned is upset, a big reduction in the lexical search task. According
to this account, furthermore, this selection of a value for the pronoun from
context is driven solely by checking on the immediate context available to
the speaker, driven by the urgency of minimising the production task. It is
not, or need not be, the result of a high-level planning decision about what
is most likely to be easily retrievable by the hearer.
This account will immediately extend to ellipsis. We expect in the lin-
earisation process mapping some propositional structure onto a string of
words that if the speaker can use structure or actions which have already
been established in context, they will do so. As in the case of anaphora, this
is not driven by the construction of higher-order assumptions about mani-
festness of the necessary assumptions for the hearer - all that is required is
to use the constructs one has in one’s own context, since it is these which can
enable the search through the mental lexicon, in the case of ellipsis totally.
This leads us to expect correctly high frequency of elliptical constructions
in language use in context both in parsing and production.
5 The Dynamics of Dialogue Modelling
With this outline of a generation model as including reference to context
as the major cost-saving device, we now have the basic tools to address the
29The mimicking of the parsing routine by that of production is important as, otherwise,
the production of a pronoun, given its lexical specification as providing a meta-variable
as Fo value, would trivially satisfy the subsumption constraint, apparently without any
reflex of the parsing step whereby it might be interpreted.
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dialogue patterning that Pickering and Garrod observe. Recall the ease with
which producer and parser roles switch in dialogue, a phenomenon which
might seem to buttress the Clark view of dialogue (Clark 1996), that inter-
pretation of a string is a collaborative enterprise, against this model. But
recall that, on this DS account, the goal of production and perception tasks
that are carried out across a role switch between speaker and hearer is not
so much to complete some linguistic string, but to complete the structures
which the added words will be providing a completion of, as witness the sin-
gle shared utterance in which the pronouns have to be interpreted to reflect
whatever incremental switch of speaker-hearer may take place:
(26) A: You’re working on...
B: Your book?
A: Yes, my book. Have you got to the
B: 7th chapter, where you go into quantification?
The phenomenon of rigid indexicality of first and second pronouns is fa-
miliar. But its significance here lies in the inapplicability of any purely
encoded logical form as a representation of some sentence meaning as input
to whatever pragmatic processes enrichment that may then be invoked to
determine the proposition expressed. As we would now expect, given the
DS perspective, the complete sentence You are working on your book ap-
parently constructed in collaboration in (26) does not provide the intended
meaning: its logical form can’t be the point of departure for subsequent
pragmatic identification of the anaphoric expressions. What is being con-
structed is the progressive construction of some representation of content,
via the incremental processing of words, with identification of values for
attendant aspects of under-specification as the interlocutor’s own context
makes them available.
This re-use of one’s own context is central to the apparent extensive
coordination between speaker and hearer roles displayed in what Pickering
and Garrod label ‘alignment’ between speakers. If one interlocutor has used
a certain structure, word or choice of interpretation, then the respondent is
much more likely to use the same structure as in (27), rather than a switch
of structure as in (28):
(27) A: Who has Mary given the book?
B: She has given Tom the book.
(28) A: Who has Mary given the book?
B: ??She has given the book to Tom.
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In so far as possible, interlocutors will go further and use the same words;
and if these words are ambiguous, their interpretation must be shared across
the various occurrences:
(29) A: Who was at the bank yesterday?
B: Sue was at the bank until lunchtime, and Harry stayed at the
bank all afternoon.
This might be seen as a form of mimicry, the second speaker copying what
the first has done, and indeed in language acquisition contexts, where such
alignment is rife (Tomasello 2003), it is often seen as exactly this, according
to Tomasello involving emergent recognition of high-level personal inter-
relationships very early on in the acquisition process. The DS perspective,
however, gives us a different take on this. On the assumption that the ac-
tions used in building up structure constitute part of the immediate context,
this apparent mimicry is yet a further instance of economy on the part of
the speaker in cutting down on full-lexicon search. If in engaging in the
task of searching for an appropriate word, the first search is through those
macros which form part of the context, and these macros provide a suitable
candidate in this production task, there will simply be no need to access the
full lexicon - this macro of actions can be used again, both in the parsing
task, and in the production task as part of the license for the string uttered.
Such selection will not have necessitated some complex assessment of man-
ifestness to the hearer, and it does not have to be checked as to whether it
constitutes part of some common ground shared by both participants: it is
based solely on one’s own immediate context. An advantage of this style of
analysis is the immediate expectation that repetitions of ambiguous words
will pick out the same interpretation, as in (29): whichever macro of actions
was triggered by the first use of the word will be called up again with the
repetition of that word, again for the same reason. It is the “mini”-lexicon
which presents the store of word-action pairs in the immediate context which
is searched first.
In similar vein, syntactic alignment occurs in the use of a word such
as give, said to have discrete syntactic properties for a single semantic con-
tent (double-object or indirect-object constructions being equivalent), where
responses to some question involving one form of question with regularity
induce replies using the same structural form (as in (27)), rather than switch-
ing to the alternative subcategorisation frame (as in (28)). This turns out
to be straightforwardly reflected by exactly the same reasoning. All that
is exceptional about a word such as give is that it is associated with two
such sequences of actions. But this is all we need to predict this so-called
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syntactic alignment. For once either of these specifications gets selected, it
is that particular update-specification that will get entered into the context,
to be retrieved by the second occurrence of the word.30
Finally, the phenomenon of shared utterances is anticipated, without
any additional stipulation. Both in parsing and production of some selected
string, the same tree is constructed because, in both tasks, the parsing pro-
cedure is central. And, if the communication task is successful, speaker and
hearer may coincide on building the same structure, each doing so in virtue
of applying the same set of rules to the unfolding of a structure relative to
the context of what has just been parsed/produced before. But if this is so,
it is not only the structure under construction which is shared between the
two of them; it is the context too. If then before completion, the hearer can
leap to the conclusion of what is being said, he can complete the partial tree
he has up till then constructed as a parser, and shift into being a producer
where the task is to complete that tree against an already completed goal
tree. Equally, the speaker can shift into being a parser, as she, too, has a
construction of whatever partial tree she had taken to match her goal tree.
On this view, this is merely a shift from providing the input for updat-
ing some partial structure, to analysing some provided input with which
to update that very same partial structure. Unlike in other frameworks,
the phenomenon of shared utterances is strikingly natural. Apart from the
abduction step of anticipation made by the interrupting interlocutor, noth-
ing new needs to be added; and even this is no more than establishing the
proposition expressed as quickly as possible, hence optimising its relevance.
Despite the apparent sharing of context, this approach allows speaker
and hearer not to share the same structure, as there is no high-level ne-
gotiation as to which structure to use: in all cases the construction of con-
text and structure for the proposition expressed whether as hearer or as
speaker turns on what is contained in what each has separately constructed.
Speaker and hearer may have quite different concepts associated with the
words used. But whatever sequence of actions they have just used, whether
as speaker or as hearer, can be used again, whether in the same role, or
across a shift. So the very assumption that the mechanism of context and
proposition construction involves the building of predicate-argument arrays
allows the process to be an entirely private, internal, one.
This is not to deny that the abductive step itself may involve an act of
mind-reading: finishing off someone’s utterance with words she herself would
30In so far as all characterisations for some given phonological form are stored together,
we might expect some latent triggering of alternative specifications (Swinney 1979).
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choose has to involve a search for what one might take to be her lexicon to
find the appropriate completion. But what the shift from hearer to producer
does not involve is the construction of an entirely new structure from which
to initiate that search. To the contrary, it involves a continuation of the
very same structure, as the playing of the Old MacDonald game makes
clear (the happily cooperating child is certainly not mind-reading). And
even the selection of words chosen is because, by presumption of relevance,
the hearer will have been establishing the proposition intended as swiftly
as possible, in this case as it happens, by a step of enrichment before the
speaker gets to finish the utterance herself. Thus what might at first glance
seem evidence for the highly coordinated view of dialogue such as that of
Clark and others,31 turns out to favour a more individualistic approach in
which parallelism between interlocutors is the result of cost-saving decisions
made by each party to the dialogue severally.
6 The Grammar-Pragmatics Interface: a new look
This paper has set out a sketch of language processing as the progressive
building of semantic representations as established in context. Anaphora
and ellipsis in particular were analysed in parallel, both as triggers for re-
using contextually provided constructs, reinstating the intuition that ellip-
sis, like anaphora, is a device for building up interpretation from context
directly. Production is defined in terms of the same tree growth processes,
differing only in the addition of a checking constraint between partial tree
and intended (representation of) content. With these albeit tiny sketches,
we saw how the Pickering and Garrod challenge could be met, with the
dynamics of the Dynamic-Syntax architecture matching dialogue patterns
in a way that no other grammar formalism can match. We thus have the
beginnings of an account of language which directly reflects the actions it
enables hearers (and speakers) to carry out in real time.
In closing, we put this account back into current theoretical perspec-
tives, and consider the degree to which this formalism provides a formal
basis from which pragmatic explanations can be given, and the nature of
the grammar-pragmatics interface that we can glean from it. The DS system
is commensurate with general Fodorian assumptions about language in so
far as syntax is defined as a progressive word by word mapping from phono-
31Clark 1996 and elsewhere argues that communication is a coordinated activity involv-
ing ongoing signalling between interlocutors of their common ground and its progressive,
successful update.
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logical sequences onto an emergent semantic representation (Fodor 1983);
and explanations are grounded in a presumption of a pervasive processing-
cost constraint reflecting relevance-theoretic assumptions. However, this
stance diverges from these assumptions in a number of ways. First, the
encoded system is a set of procedures for proposition construction, so while
there is a concept of conceptual content, as provided by specifications of
formula values that the words may project, all words encode procedures,
and not merely those words that are associated with the drawing of context-
dependent inferences (Blakemore 1990). There is no basis for distinguishing
formally between procedures which, being encoded, apply first as an encap-
sulated sub-system, and procedures of a more general sort all of which follow
on afterwards. So, unlike Relevance Theory, there is no intrinsic distinction
between lexical content of those words which project conceptual content,
and those which project procedural constraints on interpretation.
There is also no level of linguistic meaning defined as the output of
the grammar constituting a sentence meaning, this notoriously the basis on
which Cappelen and Lepore raise the charge of incoherence against contex-
tualist views of language (Cappelen and Lepore 2005: chapter 9), and the
point of departure for their own account. Their charge of inconsistency,
the most serious of the objections they raise against contextualists, turns
on there being both indefinite diversity of interpretation of a string rela-
tive to context but nevertheless a single maximally general singular logical
form constituting the sentence’s meaning. With the abandonment of any
such level, both the charge and the coherence of the alternative minimalist
conception of semantics which they espouse melt away.32 On this view, to
the contrary, the sole interface between representation of the string itself
and articulation of some denotational semantics is the level representing the
propositional content expressed by the string in a particular context. It is
at this juncture that all aspects of underspecification must have been re-
solved, satisfying whatever requirements may have been imposed. All forms
of update are part of the construction algorithm, long-distance dependency,
anaphora construal and ellipsis alike, with relevance-driven choices having to
be made as part of this construction process. Within this conception, there
is no intermediate level of logical form marking the output of some encoded
system that constitutes the necessary point of departure for subsequent en-
richment processes. It is under-specification and growth of information all
32Even the cases where particular construal of a predicate seems able to shift between
some occurrence of an expression and some subsequent elliptical fragment as in (i) can be
captured by assuming re-use of actions, rather than recovery of identical output structure:
(i) John said his kettle was blue and so did Mary.
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the way. This has the consequence that, in addressing the particular chal-
lenge of explaining ellipsis phenomena in a maximally general way, there is
no place for saying that some forms of ellipsis construal are within the do-
main of grammar, and others outside it:33 all forms of ellipsis construal are
determined directly from context, for each new input is interpreted against
the context provided by what has previously been processed. There is also
no basis for saying that some forms of ellipsis construal can be defined off
linguistic strings as part of an encapsulated system at some level prior to
their interpretation in context: seen in the terms suggested here, such a
distinction makes no sense.
A bonus is the ease with which the system can be used to provide an
incremental model of production. All that this required was to assume
that relevance considerations, specifically minimisation of cognitive costs,
apply in production just as in parsing. And it is by presuming this con-
straint that dialogue patterns became predictable, parallelism effects and
switch-utterance phenomena all falling into place without any stipulation.
It is worth re-emphasising how the proposed dialogue account could not be
sustained if one brought back in the problematic intermediate construct of
logical form corresponding to sentence meaning as a necessary interface in
the mapping between propositional content and linearisation of words to
express it. With that assumption back in place, the problems facing an
incremental account of production would return in full, for the reliance on
accessing context as a source of lexical choices was essential to explaining
success in production, as in parsing. In this, the Dynamic Syntax account
is essentially contextualist. The Cappelen and Lepore dismissal of ellipsis
as irrelevant to the contextualist debate as syntactic (Cappelen and Lepore
2005: 42) can be countered with the riposte that ellipsis construal is both es-
sentially pragmatic and syntactic, providing swathes of evidence for defining
natural-language content relative to its role in establishing context-bound
interpretations. Indeed, the intrinsic content of natural language expres-
sions, on the account promoted here, is a system of procedures for mapping
from one contextually-provided structure to another.
Perhaps surprisingly, a relatively orthodox feeding-relation between syn-
tax and pragmatics remains intact. With lexical content defined as proce-
dures for interpretation which the word encodes, the parsing of any word to
retrieve that procedure must itself be prior to any interaction with context
33See Cann et al forthcoming for a characterisation of context-dependent wellformed-
ness, enabling fragments from which some complete propositional structure is derivable
given some context to be characterised as wellformed with respect to that context.
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to determine the enriched interpretation to be provided (eg by substitution).
But such procedures, being context-relative functions, lead to enriched val-
ues as the words are successively processed relative to whatever structure
is available at that point in the construction process.34 The result is that
for any one string there characteristically will be more than one possible
sequence of transitions, hence multiple context-relative interpretations. Yet
this constitutes the end-point of the remit of the DS explanation. Defining a
selection-mechanism for capturing which interpretation is selected in which
context is not part of the model: this requires implementation of constraints
on memory retrieval and general reasoning devices, which we take to be the
remit of pragmatic theory. 35
In the end, then, the success in explaining dialogue patterns is not due
to assumptions of the DS framework alone, but in its conjunction with
relevance-theoretic assumptions. The framework itself merely presents a
formal articulation of the architecture within which relevance considerations
may determine how individual choices are made at different points in con-
structing any one such propositional representation from a given string. The
procedural, hence meta-level stance with respect to language processing, is
however ineliminable. It is the use and re-use of interpretation procedures
which form the heart of DS explanations of ellipsis, dialogue, indeed lan-
guage interpretation in general. Procedures for language processing both
constitute the vehicle for establishing interpretation and form part of the
context relative to which further interpretation is built up. And so we con-
clude: knowledge of language is not some abstract set of axioms usable only
in conjunction with parse/production mechanisms yet to be separately de-
fined, but a set of procedures for going about the task of communication.
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